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INCIVILITY AND UNPROFESSIONALISM ON APPEAL:
IMPUGNING THE INTEGRITY OF JUDGES*
Steven Wisotsky**
In general, the ethical duties of appellate lawyers are no
different from those of trial lawyers. Yet the specialized nature
of appellate practice and procedure produces a relatively small
number of recurring issues.1 One of the more prominent of these
is the prohibition against impugning the qualifications and
integrity of judges. Disrespectful criticism of judges in briefs,
motions, and public statements is a recurring problem. Having
lost at trial, lawyers often find themselves unable to resist the
temptation to attack the trial judge. Indeed, Eleventh Circuit
Judge John Godbold has warned against appealing out of "the
nerve ends of disappointment and defiance." 2 The case law
addressing these situations arises from conflicting forces: the
freedoms of the First Amendment and the ethical restrictions on
what lawyers can say or write.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer
from making "a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, ' 3 and state that "false
*This article includes some material previously published in the Florida Bar Journal. See
Steven Wisotsky, Invective on Appeal: Impugning the Integrity of Judges, 79 Fla. Bar J. I
(May 2005). A treatment of this issue appears in section 15.1 of the author's treatise
Professional Judgment on Appeal (Carolina Academic Press 2002) (Supp. 2005).
**Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University; B.A.
University of Pennsylvania, J.D. University of Miami, L.L.M. Yale University.
1. See generally J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43
S.W.L.J. 677 (1989).
2. John Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes Revisited, 2 The Record (journal
of the Fla. B. Sec. Appellate Prac. & Advocacy) 801 (March 1994).
3. ABA, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 8.2(a) (5th ed., ABA Ctr.
for Prof. Responsibility 2003) [hereinafter ABA Model Rules or ABA Model Rule, as
appropriate]. Some state rules are analogous. The Florida counterpart, for example, is
substantially similar, but it adds quasi-judicial officers like mediators and arbitrators,
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statements by a lawyer can unfairly 4undermine public
confidence in the administration of justice." With that in mind,
this article surveys cases in which attorneys have been warned,
charged, or disciplined under Model Rule 8.2(a) or its equivalent
as a result of attacks on appellate judges in and out of court.
FACT OR OPINION?
At the outset, note that the false-statement language of the
rule implies the existence of an objective set of standards for
determining the truth or falsity of the statement at issue. Many
invectives are not amenable to empirical (dis)proof. Suppose, for
example, that appellate counsel were to criticize a bench as
arrogant or ignorant. 5 Is that charge a triable fact or an
expression of opinion? There is no bright-line distinction
between them. In most cases, moreover, the classification does
not matter. The insult is what counts. Thus, a lawyer may well
be brought under disciplinary scrutiny for harsh or critical
statements of opinion if they address a court's motives,
qualifications, or alleged biases in deciding an appeal.
This blurring of the fact/opinion boundary was manifest in
a case in which a prosecutor publicly criticized a criminal-law
appellate decision in a TV interview. The attorney named the
author of the opinion, and asserted that "he made up his mind
before he wrote the decision, and just reached the conclusion
that he wanted to reach.",6 The Missouri Bar filed a disbarment
action against him. On review, the lawyer argued that his
statements "reflect subjective opinion and not verifiable factual
assertions" and could not therefore be "false."
7
The majority opinion rejected this "artificial dichotomy"
and concluded that the statement, in its full context, "at the very
jurors, and members of the venire to the list of those whose integrity may not be impugned
by counsel. Fla. R. Prof. Conduct 4-8.2(a) (LEXIS 2005).
4. ABA Model R. Prof Conduct 8.2(a), cmt. Both the Rule and the comment are
unchanged in the 2003 version of the Model Rules, which amends the 1983 version based
on the work of the Kutak Commission.
5. One lawyer accused a court of both. See Matter of Reed, 716 N.E.2d 426, 427 (Ind.
1999) (public reprimand for stating, among other things, that trial judge's "arrogance is
exceeded only by her ignorance").
6. In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
7. Id.
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least implies that the judge's conduct exhibited dishonesty and
lack of integrity and is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of
being proved true or false.' '8 Notably, a dissenting justice took
the opposite view of counsel's statements, and concluded that
there was no Rule 8.2 violation: "There is no assertion of
objective fact regarding [the judge's] 'judicial integrity.' There
is no implication 'that the judge's conduct exhibited dishonesty
and lack of integrity."' 9 In addition to parsing the lawyer's
statement as referring to the judge's reasons rather than to his
character, the dissenter argued that it was simply an assertion
that the panel opinion was "result oriented. This assertion is
frequently made about 1udicial opinions, and cannot be found to
be a statement of fact." 0
The question whether a statement is not opinion but fact,
and hence either true or false, is distinct from the question of the
lawyer's state of mind in saying it. The language of Rule 8.2(a)
clearly requires proof of the lawyer's subjective state of mind,
that is, whether he knew the statement to be false, or recklessly
disregarded the possibility that it might be false. In this regard,
Rule 8.2(a) is analogous to the law of defamation as it applies to
public officials," which requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's statement was uttered or published with "actual
malice," a term of art for knowing a statement to be false or
making it with reckless disregard for whether it is true or false.
THE REASONABLE ATTORNEY STANDARD
The majority rule is that the "actual malice" standard of
public-official defamation does not apply to attorney discipline.
Thus, in The Florida Bar v. Ray,12 an attorney contended that he
had "a subjectively reasonable basis in fact" for making
accusations against an administrative law judge hearing
8. Id. at 833.
9. Id. at 841 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting) (quoting assertions made in majority
opinion).
10. Id. at 842. The dissent went further in allowing a wide latitude for attorneys to call
judges names such as "wimps," "hanging judges," "tyrants," tools of the insurance
companies, and so forth, concluding that "[c]haracterizations such as these are not the
subject of discipline." Id.
11. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
12. 797 So. 2d 556, 558 (Fla. 2001).
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immigration cases. But the court concluded that "a purely
subjective New York Times standard is inappropriate in attorney
disciplinary actions.' 13 Instead, "the standard to be applied is
whether the attorney had an objectively reasonable factual basis
for making the statements."' 4 The rationale for rejecting the
defamation standard is that lawyers "are viewed by the public as
having unique insights into the judicial system" and therefore
the state's "compelling interest in preserving public confidence
in the judiciary"' 5 is paramount. Applying this objective
standard, the Ray court concluded that the attorney had no
reasonable basis in fact for questioning the judge's veracity, and
upheld the imposition of a public reprimand.
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman 16 is important
for its constitutional analysis of Rule 8.2(a), and because it
applies to both trial and appellate lawyers. The opinion, written
by the irrepressible Alex Kozinski, describes Rule 8.2(a) as
"overbroad"'17 and in need of a narrowing interpretation to avoid
First Amendment invalidity. The opinion also notes that "the
purely subjective standard applicable in defamation cases is not
suited to attorney disciplinary proceedings," and that such cases
are to be governed by an objective standard based upon a
"reasonable attorney."'8But unlike the Florida Supreme Court,
and indeed unlike most courts, the Ninth Circuit in Yagman
insisted on adhering to the distinction between false statements
of fact and expressions of opinion. Thus,
statements impugning the integrity of a judge may not be
punished unless they are capable of being proved true or
false; statements of opinion are protected by the First
Amendment unless they "imply a false assertion of fact."'
19




14. Id. at 559.
15. Id.
16. 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
17. Id. at 1437.
18. Id. at 1437-38.
19. Id. at 1438 (citing Milkovich v. LorainJ. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)).
20. Id.
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The court's closely reasoned opinion allowed Yagman to
escape discipline for his out-of-court accusation (made to a
reporter) that a district judge was anti-Semitic; the court
regarded that charge as containing both an assertion of fact, not
proven to be false, and an expression of opinion.21 The court
also protected Yagman's survey-response letter to Prentice Hall
calling the judge "the worst judge in the central district" and
containing a "string of colorful adjectives," including
"ignorant, .... ill-tempered,' ''buffoon,'" "sub-standard human,"
"right-wing fanatic," and the like.22 The court held that these
barbs were "statements of rhetorical hyperbole, incapable of
being proved true or false." 23 As such, they were protected by
the First Amendment.
The court then considered an alternative theory of
punishment based on interference with the administration of
justice, noting that First Amendment protections might have to
give way in the face of "a clear and present danger" to the
administration of ustice, a standard that the court characterized
as "demanding." But the court found a lack of immediacy or
"direct and immediate impact on the fair trial rights of litigants", • • 25
from Yagman's invective. The court emphasized the fact that
Yagman was not commenting upon a pending case, whereas the
Supreme Court's decision in Gentile v. State Bar 
of Nevada26
was concerned about the fair-trial impact of lawyers' comments
to the press. Thus, the Yagman court interpreted Gentile to
impose the clear-and-present danger test where no case was
pending, but a lesser substantial-likelihood test where a case was
pending. It is not clear which test should apply to a completed
appeal, although the Florida Supreme Court applied the latter in
5-H Corp. v. Padovano.
27
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1434 n. 4.
23. Id. at 1440.
24. Id. at 1442. This result is similar in spirit to the ruling that "vulgar and insulting
words or other incivility, uttered, written, or committed outside the precincts of a court are
not subject to professional discipline." Justices of the App. Div. v. Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d
426, 427 (N.Y. 1973).
25. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1443.
26. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
27. 708 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1997).
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Yagman notwithstanding, other courts are less clinically
analytical and less tolerant of tirades. Lawyers who bad-mouth
judges, whether to reporters or in their court filings, are at risk of
bar discipline. "Lawyers are officers of the court and, as such,
may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep them
from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally
protected speech.', 28 A lawyer is not only an advocate for a
client but also an officer of the court, and must therefore refrain
from hostile utterances that might well pass constitutional
muster under other circumstances. Accordingly, he or she must
refrain from "undignified or discourteous conduct which is
degrading to a tribunal.,,29 As a result, derogatory remarks and
the expression of unfavorable opinions are likely to get a lawyer
in trouble, even though the Model Rules deleted the Model Code
requirement that the lawyer be "temperate and dignified. 30
Cases from many states have put lawyers on notice.
WHAT NOT TO WRITE OR SAY
Motions for rehearing are one especially troublesome area
of appellate practice for lawyers inclined to invective;
apparently, the sting of an adverse panel opinion drives many
lawyers to use harsh language. Thus, counsel for one appellant
characterized the panel's decision as a "bad lawyer joke" in his
motion for rehearing, and the court struck an entire section of
the motion as offensive. It also admonished counsel that "such
impertinent argument is both a disservice to his client and
demeaning to the judiciary and the legal profession.",3
1
In a similar case, the losing lawyer was more aggressive in
his motion for rehearing, calling his opponent's arguments
"ridiculous," "a joke" and "total b[-] s[-]." He also indicated
28. Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030, 1081-82 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("A lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and
honor.... He who would follow that calling must conform to those standards").
29. Greene v. Va. St. Bar Assn., 411 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Va. 1976) (citing Va.
Code Prof Resp. DR 7-106 (C)(6)).
30. See Model Code of Prof. Resp., EC 1-5 (ABA 1969). In 1983, The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
31. B&L Appliances and Servs., Inc. v. McFerran, 712 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ind. App.
5th Dist. 1999).
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that he wondered whether it was possible for a Miami lawyer to
get "a fair shake up North" and raised innuendoes about possible
court bias against one of his clients and in favor of opposing
counsel. The appellate court referred a copy of the motion to the
Florida Bar, which instituted disciplinary proceedings against
the attorney, although the Bar ultimately dismissed its complaint
for want of probable cause.32 Still, the Florida Supreme Court
thought that the district court had acted properly because the
attorney's conduct
showed at the very least a "substantial likelihood" that
he had compromised the integrity of the legal
profession, engaged in professional misconduct. or
violated one or more of the. Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar.33
Like the Ninth Circuit in Yagman, the Florida Supreme Court
saw Rule 4-3.5(c) "conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal" as
bearing on the analysis.
34
Another Florida case was based on offensive language
contained in a petition for rehearing; the court did not impose
sanctions or refer the attorney for Bar discipline, but expressed
its displeasure: "It is not a part of an attorney's duties to his
clients to use language in his Petition for Rehearing, or in any
other papers filed in this court[,] that is actually insulting to the"335
members of the panel which heard the case.
In an Indiana appeal, the intemperate criticism came in a
motion to transfer the case to the state Supreme Court. The
appellant argued to the intermediate appellate panel that its
opinion "erroneously and materially misstates the record," was
"replete with misstatements of material facts," "misapplies
controlling case law," and "does not even bother to discuss
relevant cases that are directly on point." 36 That language alone
32. Padovano, 708 So. 2d at 245-46, 248.
33. Id. at 247 (footnote omitted).
34. See Fla. R. Prof Conduct 4-3.5(c) ("A lawyer should not engage in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal."); ABA Model Rule 3.5(c) (same). The court also cited the
Preamble to the Florida Rules: "A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system
and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials."
Padovano, 708 So. 2d at 246-47 (citing Fla. R. Prof. Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer's
Responsibilities). Identical language appears in the ABA Preamble.
35. Vandernberghe v. Poole, 163 So. 2d 51, 51 (Fla. App. Dist. 2 1964).
36. In re Wilkins, 777 N.E. 2d 714, 715 (Ind. 2002) [hereinafter Wilkins f], modified,
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would not have gotten the attorney into trouble because, as the
court noted, there was some factual basis for it. Rather, the"offending language" consisted of a footnote to the attorney's
Supreme Court brief stating that the panel opinion was
so factually and legally inaccurate that one is left to wonder
whether the Court of Appeals was determined to find for
Appellee Sports, Inc., and then said whatever was
necessary to reach that conclusion (regardless of whether
the facts or the law supported its decision).
37
The court drew a line between "sound advocacy and
defamation," noting that "[l]awyers are completely free to
criticize the decisions of judges," but that "[a]s licensed
professionals, they are not free to make recklessly false claims
about a judge's integrity." 38 The court construed the relevant
footnote as falling into the latter category because it
ascribes bias and favoritism to the judges authoring and
concurring in the majority opinion and it implies that these
judges manufactured a false rationale in an attempt to
justify their pre-conceived desired outcome. These
aspersions transgress the wide latitude given appellate
argument, and they clearly impugn the integrity of a judge
in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a).
39
The panel had held that the First Amendment did not
protect these "offending remarks" and imposed a thirty-day
suspension from the practice of law. On petition for rehearing,
the court mitigated the sanction to a public reprimand for three
reasons. First, the offending lawyer had "timely contacted the
offices of both the Chief Judge of the Indiana Court of Appeals
and the Chief Justice of Indiana ... offering to apologize in
person. 40  Second, the lawyer had "an outstanding and
exemplary record for honesty, integrity, and truthfulness among
his peers in the Bar, and among members of the judiciary."
Third, the offending footnote had been written by an out-of-state
782 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 2003) (reducing sanction from thirty-day suspension to public
reprimand) [hereinafter Wilkins I].
37. Wilkins II, 782 N.E. 2d at 986.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 987.
41. Id.
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co-counsel and not by the respondent himself. Still, because he
had signed the brief, the local lawyer was responsible for its
contents.42 It is also noteworthy that two justices thought that the
lawyer's conduct was protected by the First Amendment, and
was therefore not subject to any sanction at all.43 One of them
observed that the attorney's remarks were similar to criticisms
that Supreme Court justices have not infrequently aimed at one
another.
Thus, although motions may be a particularly fertile ground
for disrespectful language, appellate briefs also may give
offense. For example, where appellate counsel had argued in his
brief that the trial court had decided the case on "the basis of
conjecture," the appellate court termed the language an
unfounded accusation of judicial misconduct and admonished
counsel not to make another accusation of that sort in the
future.45 Similarly, a government lawyer drew a rebuke for
scribbling the word "wrong" beside several findings of the trial
court's order and including that order in an appendix. The court
did not impose sanctions, but deemed the conduct "indecorous
and unprofessional. ' ' 6 And a Florida appellate court referred a
lawyer to the state bar because he made "unsubstantiated
charges of collusion" against the trial judge and argued in his
appellate brief that the judge's ruling was "cockeyed and
absurd" and demonstrated a "most startling absence of legal
knowledge and irrational decision." 47 The court quoted from the
Oath of Admission to the Bar requiring attorneys to "maintain
the respect due to courts of justice and)udicial officers" and to
"abstain from all offensive personality."
42. Id.
43. Id. (Boehm, J., concurring in result); see also Wilkins I, 777 N.E.2d at 719
(Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting that the protection of the First Amendment "extends at
least as far as the statement made ... here").
44. Wilkins 1, 777 N.E.2d at 720 (Boehm, J., dissenting) (citing examples of harsh
language used by Justice Scalia).
45. Vacation Village, Inc. v. HitachiAm. Ltd, 901 P.2d 706, 707 (Nev. 1995) (warning
that such conduct "may be in violation of the rules of ethical behavior").
46. Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1989) (publicly noting misconduct
"in the hope it will not recur").
47. Shortes v. Hill, 860 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. App. Div. 5 2003).
48. Id. at 3.
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Suspension was imposed in a case in which the plaintiffs
attorney, upon losing his verdict in the appellate court, filed a
federal civil rights action accusing the state appellate judges of
having acted "illegally" in reversing the trial court's judgment.49
The federal district court dismissed the lawsuit, and the attorney
appealed to the Ninth Circuit seeking reversal. In his reply brief,
he argued that the state appellate judges, acting under color of
law, had become "parties to the theft" of his clients' property. 50
"Money is King, and some judges feel that they are there to see
that it does not lose." 51 The state bar began disciplinary
proceedings against the offending lawyer. He wrote a letter of
apology to the panel. Through a complicated course of
proceedings, including further insinuations about the integrity of
the appellate judges contained in a petition for writ of certiorari
that he filed in the United States Supreme Court, the attorney
ended up with a brief suspension and a year's probation.
Notably, two justices dissented.53
In a comparable case in which the attorney was arguably
more offensive although less persistent, her insults caused her to
be referred to the state bar for investigation.54 In that case, the
attorney had also lost a verdict on appeal. She attacked the
appellate court's reasoning as "specious" and accused the court
of making "some rather outlandish representations which are not
supported by the record, the transcript, or by any matter before
the court." Her petition for rehearing further attacked the court
for "writing new law to assist the insurance companies of a
sleazy nursing home that happen[ed] to be represented by an
insurance defense firm" and wrote that "it must be embarrassing
to take such a pro-rapist, pro-big-insurance-defense-firm
49. Ramirez v. St. Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 402, 404 (Cal. 1980).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 406 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 414.
53. Justice Newman's dissent characterized the attorney's actions as "forceful"
advocacy, id. at 414, by a self-described "poor person's lawyer," id at 419, who spoke
"sincerely though inelegantly on behalf of his clients." Id. Chief Justice Bird's dissent
deemed the discipline "rather dangerous," id. at 427, as well as inconsistent with the sharp
exchanges in which appellate judges themselves sometimes engage. Id.
54. In re Maloney, 949 S.W. 2d 385, 388 (Tex. App. 4th Dist. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam).
55. Id. at 386.
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position with so appallingly non-existent legal or logical
,,56basis.
In another Texas case, the appellate court found the
language of appellate counsel in briefs to be "insulting,
disrespectful, and unprofessional., 57 The Court of Appeals
concluded that the briefs "evidence[d] a violation of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness,
or fitness." The Court of Appeals accordingly forwarded
copies of those briefs to the Texas State Bar.
The attorney in this case was apparently provoked by the
loss of his jury verdict for both compensatory and punitive
damages, although on rehearing, the court reinstated the
compensatory damages portion of the verdict. When the
Supreme Court denied the motion for rehearing, it made a point
of reinforcing the lower court's assessment of the conduct of the
attorney: "A distinction must be drawn between respectful
advocacy and judicial denigration."5 9 The Court also pointed out
that "Courts possess inherent power to discipline an attorney's
behavior," 60 and cited the disciplinary rules governing the
conduct of a lawyer:
A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system
and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers
and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when
necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is
also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process.
6 1
The Court concluded by ordering the attorneys to show cause
why they should not be referred to the state bar for disciplinary
investigation and subjected to other sanctions.
56. Id.
57. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 907 S.W. 2d 565, 566 (Tex. App. 13th Dist.
1994) (en banc) [hereinafter Havner 1]; see also Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W. 2d 835,
840-41 (Tex. App. 4th Dist. 1997) (sanctioning counsel for disparaging remarks about the
trial court and forwarding the appellate opinion to the Office of General Counsel because a
substantial question had been raised about counsel's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer).
58. Havner I, 907 S.W 2d at 566.
59. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W. 2d 706, 732 (Tex. 1997) (quoting
Maloney, 949 S.W. 2d at 388).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 733 (quoting Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct Preamble 4, reprinted in
Tex. Gov. Code, tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Vernon Supp. 1997)).
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Acts independent of writing appellate briefs or motions
have also been sanctioned. An appellate court disbarred an
attorney because he wrote an insulting letter to the lower court
judge while the case *was on appeal.6 The attorney had sent a
letter to a magistrate of the district court accusing him of both
incompetence and religious bias in a case that was on appeal.
The Court noted that sending the letter while the case was on
appeal constituted an attempt to prejudice the administration of
justice in the course of the litigation. In addition, the accusations
were repeated on appeal even after the appellate court affirmed
the decision of the district court. The attorney's lack of remorse
appeared to be "a factor ... in deciding the severity of the
sanction imposed and in choosing between disbarment or some
lesser form of discipline."
63
CONCLUSION
Appellate advocacy should never be conducted ad
hominem. For one thing, it is ineffective; it violates the
principles of persuasion posited by classical rhetoricians: logos,
pathos, and ethos.64 Wild accusations of corruption, ethnic
prejudice, or home-town favoritism violate all three: they are not
reasonable, they are not likely to inspire sympathy in the reader,
and they are not indicative of the good character or credibility of
the accuser. Thus, the momentary gratification that may be
realized by the intemperate attorney making-or the angry client
directing-such accusations leads to self-defeat.
If the trial judge erred in ruling on a motion, on the
admissibility of evidence, on the jury instructions, or on
anything else, the appellate lawyer must do the professional
thing: screen the claimed error for its reversibility potential and
present it on its merits without resorting to a personal attack on
the judge. Similarly, if the appellate bench decides the case
wrongly, the appellate lawyer has to focus on the available tools
of correction: (1) possible review in a higher court or (2)
62. In reEvans, 801 F.2d 703, 705 (4th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 707, n. 1.
64. See generally e.g. David S. Coale, Classical Citation, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process
733 (2001).
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rehearing, clarification, or any other post-decision review
procedure provided for under the relevant rules.
Trial judges, like appellate judges, can make mistakes and
misstate the law without being collusive or corrupt. Attorneys
should limit their pleadings and briefs to addressing their legal
errors because it is unprofessional to make or imply charges of
collusion or corruption, "no matter how clearly wrong the
ruling."
65
Appellate lawyers who resort to invective do their clients
no good and put themselves at risk of disciplinary proceedings
or other sanctions. Their reputations will also suffer among the
very judges they need for relief in future cases. Incivility in
appellate practice is not only bad advocacy, it is also bad for
career development. Conversely, vigorous advocacy gains
power from fire concentrated on the record and argument
presented in accordance with the principles of good appellate
practice.
65. Shortes, 860 So. 2d at 4 (Sharp, J., concurring).

